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NOTES.
BANKRUPTCY-SALE OF PROPERTY BY TRUSTEE-DOWER INTER-
EST OF WIFE-The United States District Courts have reached di-
rectly opposite results in applying the Bankruptcy Law of 1898, as
amended in i9IO, to the law of Pennsylvania. The question in-
volved is whether or not, under the act, the purchaser of the bank-
rupt's property, sold by the trustee under order of court, takes such
property free and clear of the inchoate right of dower of the bank-
rupt s wife. The court for the middle district held just a year ago
that such a sale divested the bankrupt's real estate of the wife's
dower right." The court for the western district now holds directly
contra.2 As is so often the case, the split here is due to a strict
interpretation of the words of the Bankruptcy Act on the one hand,
and on the other, to a broader interpretation of the act read in the
light of the existing law of Pennsylvania.
At common law the wife's right of dower was not considered
a part of the estate of her husband and was not affected by pro-
3 It re Cordori, 207 Fed. Rep. 784 (1913).
(214)
NOTES 215
ceedings in bankruptcy against him.' Likewise in Penfisylvania,
dower is an estate of the wife and not merely a lien whicl she has
on her husband's estate.4  However, to this rule there are two
exceptions, and it is because of these exceptions that the difference
of opinion in the principal cases has arisen. In 17o5 an act was
passed providing certain methods for taking lands in execution for
payment of debts.5 Though no mention was made of dower, the
courts curiously enough interpreted this act and other acts on the
subject as permitting the taking of the wife's dower right to sell on
execution upon a judgment recovered against her husband, or upon
a scire farias on a mortgage executed by him alone.' Thus the right
of dower in Pennsylvania is similar to that right at common law
except in so far as the law of Pennsylvania has made the wife's
dower a chattel for the payment of the husband's debts. But the
courts have refused to extend this abridgment of the common law
rule.' Mr. Justice Gray in the Supreme Court of the United States
said that "the state court has constantly held s that, with these ex-
ceptions [i. e., those noted, supra], the right of dower is as much
favored in Pennsylvania as elsewhere, and that the old decisions
are not to be extended and that neither an absolute conveyance by
the husband nor an assignment by him for benefit of creditors .
impairs the wife's right of dower."i
Relying on the decision of last year" it was contended in re
Chotiner 11 that the trustee under the Bankruptcy Act is, in Pennsyl-
vania, in the same position as a judgment creditor and, therefore,
has power to divest the bankrupt's wife of her dower right in the
property sold, i. e., that the trustee now comes under the exceptions
noted above. The Amendment of June 25, i9IO, to Section 47a (2)
provides that the trustee "shall be deemed vested with all the rights,
remedies and powers of a creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable
proceedings thereon."'12 Such a creditor under the Pennsylvania ex-
ception may divest the wife of her dower rights and the wording of
the act would seem to put the trustee into the shoes of a judgment
'In re Chotiner, =i6 Fed. Rep. 916 (Sept. 17, 1914).
'Squire v. Compton, Vin. Ab. Dower, G. pl. 6o; Smith v. Smith, $ Ves.
189 (i8oo).
'Bachman v. Chrisman, 23 Pa. 162 (1854); Diefenderfer v. E4blerman.
113 Pa. 305 (1886).
$i Sm. L. 57.
' Graff v. Smith, i Dall. 481 (Pa. z789).
'But greatly extended by statute today in England. See Dower Act, z833,
3 & 4 Win. 4.
'Kennedy v. Nedrow, i Dal. 415 (Pa. 1789); Helfrich v. Obcomyer, YS
Pa. 113 (x85o).
'Porter v. Lazear, 1o9 U. S. 84 at p. 88 (883).
" Supra, n. i.
" Supra, n. 2.
1U. S. Comp. St. Supp. (Ig91), p. i5O.
216 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
creditor. Section 7oa (5) is also in point.'3 However, it was part
of the original Act of 1898 and has been held not to include in the
bankrupt's salable property the dower interest of his wife."1 But
the meaning of Section 47, supra, is yet to be interpreted by a higher
court.
A consideration of the purpose of the Amendment of i91o may
throw some light on the subject. It would seem that it was passed
to remedy a defect in the original act arising over the question of
what title the trustee acquired to personal property of the bank-
rupt, which had been the subject of a conditional sale.'
5 In the case
cited it was held that, since the trustee was vested with no better
title than the bankrupt himself had, the conditional vendor might
retake the property for failure of bankrupt to pay for it. Yet the
law of the State of Ohio made the conditional sale void as against
creditors of the bankrupt. Thus the creditors could have levied on
this property previous to bankruptcy, yet subsequently the trustee
for benefit of creditors could not. Many cases have since arisen on
this question,1 6 and it is generally admitted that it was for this pur-
pose that the Amendment of 1910 was passed. 1T7 On the other hand
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has flatly said that the amend-
ment has given the trustee "the power to assert every right which
such [judgmeit] creditors could have asserted during the period of
four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy."1 8 There is no doubt of the meaning of this. It lays down
a broad principle and appears to bring the trustee within that excep-
tional class which, in Pennsylvania, is allowed to divest the bank-
rupt's wife of dower right. In spite of this, however, the District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania maintains that the
Bankruptcy Act vests in the trustee "no other estate than the bank-
iupt's" 9 and insists that the wife holds a separate estate and not a
mere chose in action against her husband's estate
0
The Bankruptcy Law, as a federal statute, should be enforced
throughout the States with as much uniformity as possible. Some
fifteen States, including Massachusetts, New Jersey and New York,
protect dower even from execution by a judgment creditor or a
mortgagee where the wife did not join in making the mortgage.
2 1
'The section referred to reads "The trustee of the estate of a-bank-
rupt . . . shall . . . be vested with the title of the bankrupt . . .
to all . . . property which prior to the filing of the petition he could
by any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and
sold under judicial process against him."
In re Hays, 181 Fed. Rep. 674 (g0).
"York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U. S. 344 (igo6).
"Holt v. Henley, 232 U. S. 637 (1914).
"Collier on Bankruptcy (loth. ed.), 8147, 659
" Bank of N. A. v. Penn Motor Car Co., 235 Pa. 194 (Z912).
SSupmr, 4 a.
Al, IL lowa, Md., Mass., Mich, Miss, Mo., N. J., N. Y., N. C., Ohio,
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Thus the i9o Amendinent will have no bearing on this point in
these States and the trustee will continue unable to divest the bank-
rupt's wife of her dower right. To line up Pennsylvania with these
States and thereby make uniform the application of the Bankruptcy
Act, in re Chotlinr must be upheld by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Clearly the General intent of the Amendments of
i i91o, as seen by.the debates of Congress 22 and their interpretation
by the courts, 22 was to deal with the question of conditional sale,
supra. There is nothing tending to prove that it was to affect the
dower right of the bankrupt's wife. Whether that right shall be pro-
tected in Pennsylvania depends upon the local law of that State.
It is submitted that it is better to carry out the intent of Congress
and at the same time retain the common law principle of dower
than, merely because of a technical similarity of words, to extend
the exceptions which have long existed in the law of Pennsylvania
and include the trustee in bankruptcy in that class of persons which
is permitted to divest a wife of her traditional dower right.
H. 1.
CARRIERs-DISCRIMINATION-As to whether or not the com-
mon law provided against discrimination by carriers, there is great
diversity of opinion. It would seem that no such rule existed in
England.1 Although there is a decided conflict with respect to this
question in the United States, the weight of authority upholds the
view that all shippers similarly situated were entitled to equal rates.
Legislation in both countries has removed all room for doubt con-
cerning the law to be applied today.8
Since today carriers must charge the same rate for substan-
tially the same transportation service at the same time and under
substantially similar circumstances, the question arises as to what re-
covery may be had by a shipper against whom a carrier has dis-
criminated. A recent opinion of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
is to the effect that damages are to be measured by the difference
between the rate paid by the plaintiff and the lower rate enjoyed by
S. C., Tenn., Va., and Wis.
Congressional Record, 6ist Congress, pp. 2552-4.t Supra, n. 4.
'Great Western Ry. Co: v. Sutton, L R. 4 H. L. 238 (i869); Baxen-
dale v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co., 4 C. B. (N. S.) 63 (x8A8).
* Messenger v. P. R. R., 36 N. J. L 407 (1873); Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co, 145 U. S. 276 (i89i). But see
contra, Johnson v. Pensacola Ry. Co., 6 Fla. 623 (1878), where it is said
that the carrier's only duty was to allow reasonable rates.
*English Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, kgo, 8 & 9 Vict., c. ao
(845), and Interstate Commerce Act, §2. Almost all of the separate states-
have enacted similar provisions to apply to interstate commerce.
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the favored shipper.' In so holding this court refused to follow the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Pennsylvania
Railroad v. International Coal M ining Conpany,3 where this rule
of damages waS strictly repudiated.
The plaintiffs-in both of these cases had paid the schedule rates
for shipments of freight while other shippers engaged in similar
business had been allowed:rebates by the railroads. The United
States court admitted that there was a good cause of action against
the railroad for unjust discrimination, but held that nominal dam-
ages only could be recovered because the plaintiff had proved no
substantial damage. In other words, substantial recovery would be
allowed only as compensation for injury received and injury con-
sisted only of loss in business due to being undersold in market by
another shipper who was enabled to do this because of the lower
rate allowed him. Mr. Justice Lamar, speaking for the court, said
in part, "Having paid only the lawful rate, plaintiff was not over-
charged. . . . There was no proof of injury-no proof of de-
crease in business, loss of profits, expense incurred or damage of
any sort suffered."
The .Minnesota court, on the other hand, after discussing this
case and declining to follow it, affirmed that their previous convic-
tions were only strengthened by passages in the opinions upon which
this decision was based.' The rule laid down in the Minnesota case
was that the disfavored shipper has a right of action for damages,
at least to the extent of the discrimination! This was also the
opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney who voiced a vigorous dissent from
his colleagues on the United States Supreme Court.3
There are many arguments on both sides of the question as to
whether the law provides a substantial recovery for unjust discrim-
ination when the claim is founded merely upon the fact that the car-
rier has allowed a lower rate to one of the laintiff's competitors.
In considering the matter of damages, the first thought that sug-
gests itself is that one who is compelled to pay more to have his
goods transported than another who is competing with him, is dam-
aged to the extent of the difference between these two rates. It
seems to be a strange theory which can be worked out along the line
that he who is allowed transportation for the lower figure is being
' Seaman v. Minneapolis & R. R. Ry. Co., x49 N. W. Rep. z34 (Minn.
x9r4).
'230 U. S. 184 (1912).
'Texas, etc., R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S.
233 (1895), where it was said, "Nor is there any legal injustice in one per-
son procuring a particular service cheaper than another"; and Parsons v.
Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 167 U. S. 447 (896), in which the court held that
one who is charged a reasonable rate has no right to complain because
another is given a lower rate.
' See opinion in 121 Minn. 488.
'230 U. S. 208-247.
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benefited, btit no injury is being inflicted upon him who must pay
the higher. Under this doctrine recovery may be had only when the
goods of the separate shippers come into direct market competition,
as in this case alone is it possible to prove damages resulting from
the discrimination.
The problem to be solved is whether the legislation which has.
been passed to regulate this matter and avoid unjust discrimination,
was meant to apply purely in cases where consequential damages
result, or whether it was not intended to strike at the root of the evil
and compel the carrier to charge equal rates to all shippers similarly
situated, providing substantial recovery to the amount of the differ-
ence if any such shipper were charged more than another. Going
back to the Act of Parliament,9 upon which the Interstate Com-
merce Act and most of our statutes have been based, we find the
cases divided under it upholding the latter view." Inasmuch as
these decisions had been rendered previous to the enactment of our
legislation on this subject, 2%r. Justice Pitney points out that Con-
gress must have had in mind that the same conclusions would be
reached tinder the Interstate Commerce Act.1 The majority opinion
in that case is based upon the fact that a clause expressly allowing
the measure of damages to be the difference in rate was struck out
of the act before adoption. It appears, however, that this was done
in order to provide generally in one clause'2 for damages recover-
able for breach of any provsion of the act.
An argument has been allowed that if a shipper who has paid
no more than the legalized tariff rate is allowed to recover the differ-
ence between this and a lower rate enjoyed by a favored shipper,
this would amount to the authorization of a second illegal act on the
part of the railroad which must charge the regular tariff rate. This
contention, however, should bear but little weight. The railroad
occupies a position of economic advantage with respect to the ship-
per, and the law must interfere to protect the latter. Unless a pub-
lished tariff is considered as sacred, there is no reason to hold that
a carrier who has already departed therefrom in one instance should
not be compelled to treat all competing shippers alike. It hardly
seems logical to say that if one shipper is charged more than others,
he may recover the difference provided he paid more than the tariff
rate, but not so if he paid exactly the rate prescribed by the tariff.
The carrier is guilty of discrimination in the one case as well as the
other, and the shipper paying the higher rate is equally injured in
both cases.
J.N.E.
'Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, .supra.
" Great Western Ry. Co. v. Sutton, supra: London, etc., Ry. Co. v. Ever-
shed, L R. 3 App. Cas. io29 (1878); Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Man-
chester, etc., Ry. Co., L R. rr App. Cas. 97 (xS).
u23o U. S., at page 237.
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DAMAGES-PENALTY OR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES-A sum of
money payable upon the breach of an agreement to perform some
collateral act, may be either a penalty for failure to perform as
agreed or a sum in liquidation of damages caused by the breach. The
penalty, being a punishment for-non-performance is unenforceable
save to indemnify the party injured by the breach, since no one may
profit-by the wrong of another. On the other hand there are many
instances where one suffers by a breach but the damages are not
readily ascertainable or are not susceptible of proof, and it is highly
equitable in such cases that the parties should determine as nearly
as possible the amount which will compensate the injured party,
who may enforce a stipulation to that effect. It is natural that per-
sons, knowing of the non-enforcibility of penalties, yet wishing to
provide for them,"will attempt to frame them in such words that
they will seem to be liquidation of damages. Again, persons igno-
rant of the law. on penalties, may, contemplating a liquidation of
damages in an apt case, term the sum payable on default, a penalty.
The attempt on the part of courts to protect defaulting persons from
penalties in disguise and to carry into effect the legitimate intent of
innocent persons has caused the confusion in the law of penalty and
liquidation of damages. The case of Bankers' Surety Company v.
Elkhorn Drainage District,' recently decided in Nebraska, if found
to contain a correct application of the general rules governing the
distinction between a penalty and liquidated damages, will throw
great doubt over the decisions which up to this time have been con-
sidered the nearest possible approach to uniformity in a subject in
which each case must necessarily depend largely on its own facts.
That the sum of eleven thousand dollars payable on failure to com-
plete a piece of work costing thirty thousand dollars on a day named,
may be collected as a sum named in liquidation of damages is the
startling decision in that case.
"The inquiry of the court is not whether the parties have acted
wisely, but what was the meaning and intent of the parties; and,
when that is ascertained from the language of the parties themselves
it must be given effect." The error in the Surety Company case
flows from the misapplication of the first principle expressed in that
case and the application of the second principle. It is undeniable
that the meaning and intent of the parties must be gathered from
1214 Fed. Rep. 242 (1914). Upon the drainage district's agreement not
to enforce forfeiture on December 31, 1go, the construction company entered
into a bond to pay thirty dollars per day stipulated damages for every day
after December 31, i9io, until the work was completed, provided that if the
work was completed on or before December 31, i91i, the bond to be null
and void. In November, 191, the construction company announced its in-
ability to complete the work and, after notification to the construction com-
pany and the surety company, the drainage district entered and finished the
work in May, 1912. The contested point is the collection of $Io,98o, being
thirty dollars for each day from December 3, 19io, to the same day, x911.
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their language,2 but there must be a liberal construction of the agree-
ment. The true inquiry is, not what the parties intended to say, but
what result they intended to be accomplished by their agreement.
That result as found may or may not be one which a court of law
or equity will enable them to effectuate.
There is no longer any doubt that courts are not bound by the
name given by parties to an agreement to the sum payable on de-
fault.3 . A penalty is odious and unenforceable under any name. A
penalty has certain attributes, as does a liquidation of damages and a
sum having the attributes of what is in law a penalty is a penalty,
whether actually called a penalty or liquidated damages. Since the
name does not conclude as to further inquiry, the attributes of the
amount here made payable may be inquired into. In two re.spects
this resembles a sum named in liquidation of damages. A per diem
stipulation is prima facia a stipulation of damage caused by delay"
and there is, furthermore, a field here where damages are not readily
ascertainable, in fact are highly conjectural. Since non-ascertainabil-
ity of exact damages is a prime requisite for liquidated damages,"
this merely tends to show this is a field within which liquidation of
damages may operate, but is no proof that this particular sum is in
liquidation of damages. Nor was this a true per diem stipulation,
which involves an increase in the amount due in proportion to the
delay in completion. But here either the full amount was to be paid
or none was to become due.
There are, then, no presumptions in favor of considering this
a liquidation of damages. On the other hand there are many ob-
jections, chief of which is that it answers preclsely the definition of
a penalty.' To apply the rule properly announced by the court
in the Surety Company case, and casting aside 2ll surplusage, the
bond given was to pay ten thousand nine hundred and eighty dol-
lars, provided that if the work was finished on or before December
31, 1911, the bond to be null and void. It is immaterial that instead
of saying ten thousand nine hundred and eighty dollars, the bond
read thirty dollars times the number of days in the year i9In, in-
cluding also December 31, 1910, for the agreement was to pay
ten thousand nine hundred and eighty dollars or nothing. If the
'Berger v. Nantz, 172 I1. App. 623 (912); W bster v. Bosanquit, L R.
(1912) Ap. Cas. 394; Clark v. Britton, 76 N. H. 64 (ixgi).
" Clydebank Engineering Co. v. Custaneda, L. R. (19o5) App. Cas. 6;
Grunblatt v. McCall & Co., 64 So. Rep. 748 (Fla. 1914); Diestal v. Steven-
son, 2 K. B. 345 (Eng. igo6).
4 Clydebank Engineering Co. v. Custaneda, supra, n. 3; Moses v. Attuono
17 So. Rep. 925 (Fla. 1go8).
'Webster v. Bosanquit, supra, n. 2; Stratton v. Fike, 166 Ala. 203 (.9to);
Emery v. Boyle, 20o Pa. 249 (i9o).
""In general, a sum of money in gross, to be paid for non-performance, -
is considered a penalty.' Whitfield v. Levy, 35 N. J. L. T49 (1871); Wright
v. Bott, z63 S. W. Rep. 36o (Tex. 19T4).
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work was finished on December 3r, 1911, nothing was to be paid;
if on January I, 1912, ten thousand nine hundred and eighty dollars
was to be the damages agreed on, damages apparently occurring
over night. There is no pretense that more than thirty dollars dam-
ages was incurred for the delay. This is not a case where there are
extraordinary damages by breach on the day certain.7 It would be
a gross misinterpretation of The Sun Publishing Company v.
A oore,8 cited in the Surety Company case to cite it in support of the
proposition that courts will not take into consideration disparity be-
tween possible actual damages and a sum named as liquidated dam-
ages, for that case stands for the principle that, granted the sum is
a liquidation of damages, actual damages cannot be proved. The
case does not for a moment deny the rule that gross disparity be-
tween actual damages and a sum called liquidated damages is evi-
dence that the sum was intended to have the effect of a penalty
rather than liquidated damages." The prior default is immaterial.
One cannot take advantage of another's default to impose uncon-
scionable terms upon him,'" so the entire agreement must stand or fall
by itself. It is not analogous to the case of Thompson v. Hudson,"'
for here there is a new liability imposed.
The court, it is submitted, erred in holding that effect must be
given to the intention of the parties. If, as seems to be the case, the
parties created a penal liability, courts consistently refuse to carry
into effect that intention and to lend their aid to enforcement of a
penalty. 2 They will, on the other hand, extend their power to relieve
against a penalty already imposed, despite the intention of the par-
ties at the time of agreement actually to pay and impose the penalty.
It might be contended, since the construction company was al-
ready in default and the sum of thirty dollars per diem could have
been collected if it had been actually intended as liquidated damages,
that the thirty dollars actually fell due each day until the completion
of the work but that as much as had fallen due was released upon
completion by way of bonus.1 3 But the longer the delay, the greater
'Kunkel v. Wheery, i89 Pa. 198 (1899), where contractor, himself under
heavy per diem stipulation, enforced same against sub-contractor; in Bed-
ford v. Miller, 212 Fed. Rep. 368 (1914), where contractor, under similar
circumstances, relieved of his per diem liability, could not enforce against his
sub-coniractor. Curtis v. Van Bugh, 161 N. Y. 47 (1899).
a 183 U. S. 642 (igoi), actual damages $65;ooo, liquidated damages $75,ooo.
'Graham v. Lebanon, 24o Pa. 337 (1913) ; Nichols-Shephard Co. v. Beyer,
x68 Mo. App. 686 (913).
"Van Kammel v. Higley, 172 III.App. 88 (1912).
L. R. 4 Eng. Ir. I (Eng. i869), where agreement to take smaller sum
in satisfaction of larger debt if paid on day certain. Held: Larger sum
recoverable on failure to pay smaller sum on day named.
"Bell v. Scranton Coal Mines Co., iio Pac. Rep. 628 (Wash. 19io);
Nakawaga v. Okamoto, 164 Cal. 718 (1913).
'Bonus is not a gratuity but a sum paid for services or upon a con-
sideration in addition to or in excess of that which would ordinarily be
NOTES
the amount due and released and the higher the bonus.. This is put-
ting a premium on delay and in no sense a sum paid to expedite the
work.
Were another objection needed, it might be found in the fact
that this sum was named as liquidation of damages caused by delay
and not for damage caused by entire breach. Whether courts
would allow the plaintiff a reasonable time to complete the work
himself or whether they would refuse the stipulation altogether has
not been decided.14 Certain it is that in case of entire breach, the
injured party is not limited to stipulate damages.15 Nor may he al-
low liquidated per diem damages to accumulate indefinitely.1 .
J.F.H.
LICENsEs-REVOCA3LE OR IRREVOCABLE-THEATRE TiKcETS--
A recent decision of the English Court of Appeals' is of interest be-
cause apparently it definitely overrules the well known doctrine of
Wood v. Leadbitter,2 which is a leading case on this question. In
that case the plaintiff Wood had purchased a ticket of admission io
the Doncaster Race Course, and had been admitted. He was re-
quested to leave for no apparent reason, and upon refusal was
ejected with no more force than was necessary. Baron Alderson
laid down the rule that a ticket of this kind gave a mere license
revocable at the will of the licensor. The following quotation from
his opinion throws light on the manner in which this result was
reached. At page 842 he says: "That no incorporeal inheritance
can either be created or transferred other than by deed, is a propo-
sition so well established, that it would be meie pedantry to cite
authorities in its support," and at page 843: "Now, in the present
case the right claimed by the plaintiff is a right, during a portion of
each day, for a limited number of days, to pass into and through
and remain in a certain close belonging to Lord Eglintown; to go
and remain where if he went and remained, he would, but for the
ticket, be a trespasser. This is a right affecting land at least as ob,
viously and extensively as a right of way over the land." Briefly
then the very foundation of this doctrine is that since the right to
given, Kenicott v. The Supervisors, 16 Wall. 452 (1872); " 3oo per day in
excess of consideration for work done is a bonus for expedition," Macintosh
v. Railway Co., 14 M. & W. 548 (Eng. z845).
Ua Sedgwick, Damages (9th ed.), §419 (1912).
Is Murphy v. U. S. Guaranty Co., zoo App. Div. 93T (N. Y. z9o5); Bad-
galupi v. Phoenix Building Co., 112 Pac. Rep. 892 (Cal. agro).
" Phaneuf v. Corey, igo Mass. 237 (i9o6) ; Gillett v. Young, ixo Par- Rep.
766 (Colo. igog).
'Hurst v. Pictures Theatre (Lin.), 30 T. L. R. 642 (Eng. x914); also
reported in 58 Soi- JouR. 739.
' 13 M. & W. 838 (1845).
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enter a place of anmusement is a right affecting land, and since a
ticket of admission is not a deed, nothing more than a mere revoca-
ble license can be created.8
The proposition that a simple license is revocable at the will of
the licensor is fundamental.4 This is so though the license is under
seal,e or written,6 or founded upon a consideration.1 It may be re-
voked by express words to that effect,5 or by other acts of the li-
censor indicating an intention to revoke.'
But, on the other hand, thel~iroposition is equally well settled
that where a license is coupled %ii'l" a'grant "the party who has given
it cannot in general revoke it so is to defeat his grant to which it is
incident." 0 This is the docifine of Hurst v. Pictures Theatre, the
case under discussion. On the facts, the case could not be distin-
guished from Wood v. Lcadbitter, but the court held, with one judge
dissenting on the ground that the earlier case was still good law,
that, "a license coupled with an agreement not to revoke it for good
consideration conferred an enforceable right, and- the grant of a
right to enter upon the premises and to see a spectacle included a
contract not to revoke until the performance was ended." The
importance of this decision rests in the fact that whereas under the
earlier doctrine, the ticket holder, having no right to remain on the
premises, could only recover the price of his ticket when ejected; in
the Hurst case it was held a breach of contract for the management
of the theatre to eject him and he was therefore allowed consequen-
tial damages. Apparently then this case limits the right to revoke
the license to cases of violation of the -conditions, express or im-
plied, of the contract of admission and though, it is submitted, the
decision cannot be supported, having regard to the objection raised
by Wood v. Leadbitter, nevertheless the equitable side of the situa-
tion necessitates this ruling. From the practical point of view of
everyday life it is undoubtedly true that when a man buys a ticket
of admission to any spectacle to which the public is admitted, he
understands, as does the management, that if he conducts himself
with propriety he will not be interfered with. The Hurst case con-
sequently tre2ts the relation as contractual with the implied condi-
tion that so long as the holder behaves himself the management
In Hurst v. Pictures Theatre (Lim.), supra; this point was not men-
tioned by the court.
'Elias, Theatre Tickets, p. 5; McCrea v. Marsh, 12 Gray, 21T (Mass.
18,5); Burton v. Scherpf, 83 Mass. 133 (,861).
'Jackson v. Babcock, 4 Johns. 418 (N. Y. iog).
Tillotson v. Preston, 7 Johns. 285 (N. Y. x8io).
'Cook v. Ferbert, T45 Mo. 462 0898) ; Burton v. Sclerpf, supra.
'Troxell v. Iron Co., 42 Pa. 513 (1862); Barksdale v. Haviston, 81 Va.
64 (1886).
*Johnson v. Skillman, 29 Minn. 9s (z882).
'Wood v. Leadbitter, supra; Wood v. Manley, xi Ad. & EL 34 (Eng.
1839).
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agrees not to revoke the license. However, as stated above, the rea-
soning evades the stumbling block of the court in the Wood case
and does not remove it, although this seems to be the only equitable
solution of a very difficult, problem.
The decision in the Hurst case was also based upon the ground
that the trend of judicial opinion in England since Wood v. Lead-
bitter has been to depart from that case. In this connection an ex-
amination of the English decisions since 1845 is of interest. As
early as 1859, Vice Chancellor Page Wood refused to apply the rule
in equity," and in Lowe v. Adains" the Master of the Rolls ex-
pressed the opinion that, having regard to equitable considerations,
it was extremely doubtful that Wood v. Leadbitter was still good
law. In the light of these decisions therefore it is not surprising
that a court of law has finally flatly refused to apply the old doc-
trine.
Turning to the American cases on the point the prevailing rule
is in accord with Wood v. Leadbitter." In Pennsylvania there was
dicta to the contrary in Drew v. Peer14 to the effect that the right of
ticket holders "was more than a mere license. It was more in the
nature of a lease, entitling them to peaceable ingress and egress,
and exclusive possession of the designated seats during the perform-
ance on that particular evening." However this dicta was expressly
disapproved in Horney v. Nixon" and Wood v. Lcadbitter was cited
with approbation. Thus the rule here is apparently in accord with
that case. But in support of the doctrine of the Hurst case, ex-
pressions may be found in some cases which seem to limit the right
to revoke to a breach of the contract of admission." In California
an act was passed in 1893 to accomplish this same purpose, i. e.,
that no person may be refused admission to a place of public amuse-
ment "provided, that any person under the influence of liquor, or
who is guilty of boisterous conduct, or any person of lewd or im-
moral character, may be excluded from such place of amusement.""
This statute has been held constitutional
1 8
The New York Law Journal approves of the decision in the
Hurst case and says: "There is no theoretical justification for hold-
ing that a theatre ticket is a mere personal license and as such arbi-
trarily revocable. The purchase of a theatre ticket is a contract and
"Frogley v. Earl of Lovelace, z Johns. Vice Chancery 333 0859).
"L R. [,911] 2 Ch. 59g&
McCrea v. Marsh, supra; Burton v. Scherpf, supra; Homey v. Nixon,
213 Pa. 2o (i9o5).
"93 Pa. 234 (i8go).
"213 Pa. 2o (19o5).
"Smith v. Leo, 92 Hun, 242 (N. Y. i895) ; Crumore v. Huber, 18 App.
Div. 231 (N. Y. 1897).
"Cal. Stat. 1893, p. 20
"Greenberg v. Western Turf. Assn., 140 Cal. 357 (1903).
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no amount of casuistry can make it anything but a contract."
Though the correctness of the first part of this statement in the light
of the decisions enumerated is doubtful, it is submitted that the
latter part is a correct exposition of what the law should be.
J. W. L.
TRUSTS-ERECTION OF MONUMENT AS A CHARITY-In deter-
mining the validity of testamentary provisions for the erection of
monuments or for the care and maintenance of tombs and burial
grounds, there are two importint considerations to be noted: first,
does the provision authorize or direct an immediate expenditure;
second, does it provide for continued care and maintenance.
It would seem that such a bequest does not constitute a public
charity, although generally considered under that branch of the law.
just what is a public charity is not determinable by any well de-
fined rule, but since the Statute of 43 Elizabeth 2 the enumeration
of classes therein contained are indicative of the lines within which
a gift must fall in order to be upheld as a charity by the court. Or,
as has been stated by a modern jurist, "Whatever is given for the
love of God, or for the love of your neighbor, in the catholic and
universal sense-given from these motives and to these ends-free
from taint or stain of every consideration that is personal, private or
selfish, is a gift for charitable uses."'2 It is clear that a gift for the
erection of a monument is not a gift for a charitable use within the
rule stated 3 and the court was justified in so holding in the recent
case of the Morristown Trust Company v. Mayor of Morristown.'
In that case, a legacy of five thousand dollars was appropriated for
the erection of a bronze and granite base for the flagstaff in the
Morristown Park when the proper consent should be obtained for
its erection from the trustees of the park and the municipal authori-
ties of the town; and there was a provision that it was to bear an
inscription that it was erected to the memory of the testator's
father.
But although a gift for the erection of a monument is not for a
charitable use, neither is it open to the objection that it creates a
perpetuity, where it provides for the immediate expenditure of the
bequest, and it has been frequently held that such a bequest or direc-
tion in a will is valid.5 "To hold otherwise would be to deny the
right of the testator to dispose of his estate," It is not necessary
Stat. 43 Eliz., c. 4 (6oi).
'Binney, J., in Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 25 (1857).
'Trimmer v. Danby, 25 L. J. Ci. N. S. 424 (1856).
'9T Ati. Rep. 736 (N. J. 1914).
' Detwiller v. Hartman, 37 N. J. Eq. 347 (1883); Bainbridge's Appeal,
97 Pa. 482 (i88I); Melvain v. Hockaday, 36 Tex. Civ. App. i (i9o4).
'Detwiller v. Hartman, supra, n. s.
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that the monument be to the memory of the testator. It is a good
gift if to the memory of the testator's parents; 7 or to the memory
of certain distinguished men.8 A bequest for the purchase of a
burial lot and fence therefor is analogous to a gift for the erection
of a monument and has been so held.9 Such gifts stand on the same
footing as an expensive funeral.10 -
But where, under our second consideration, the testamentary
provision creates a perpetual trust for the preservation and main-
tenance of the graves or monuments of the testator or other named
persons, it is void as being repugnant to the Rule against Per-
petuities." Such a gift, to be valid, must be of such a nature that it
can be upheld as a charitable use, and that this may be possible the
general public, and not merely individuals, must have an advantage
in it. Just what is sufficient to make the gift one for a charitable use
is not clear, but it seems well established at common law that a pro-
vision for a trust for the purpose of keeping a private burial lot in
repair is not made a charity by a direction that any surplus shall be
applied to the general maintenance of the cemetery, 2 or other char-
itable use.'1 By statute in many states, however, it is provided that
gifts for the care and maintenance of graves, cemeteries and church-
yards shall not fall by reason of being made in perpetuity, but shall
be held to be made for a charitable use.1" Such acts are of course
valid."5
A distinction is made between a bequest in trust to apply the
income for the benefit of a churchyard as a whole, and one for the-
maintenance of a particular grave or graves therein. A gift ofthe
former kind is almost universally held to be a charitable gift,' s and
this even though the gift be for the upkeep of a family burying
ground.'
'Masters v. Masters, x P. Wins. 423 (1717); Fite v. Beasley, 12 Lea, 328
(189,). .
'Gilmer v. Gilmer, 42 Ala. 9 (x868).
Detwiller v. Hartman, supra, n. 5; Fite v. Beasley, supra, n. 7.
' Mellick v. The Asylum, Jacob. i8o, 23 Rev. Rep. 21 (Eng. 182).
"Sherman v. Baker, 2o R. I. 446 (1898) ; Hilliard v. Parker, 76 N. J. 2q.
447 (i9o9); Bates v. Bates, i34 Mass. 1xo (1883); Re Davitt, 188 N. Y. 567
(19o7).
"Hilliard v. Parker, mupra, n. I; M. E. Church v. Gifford, 5 Pa. C. C.
92 (1888).
nColt v. Comstock, 51 Conn. 352 (1883)..
"Penna. Act of May 26, i8gi, P. L. i19; N. J. Act of 1878; N. Y.,
C. i98 of Laws of 1884; Mass. Pub. Stat., chap. 116, §36.
" Nauman v. Weidman, 182 Pa. 263 (897); Moore v.- Moore, So N. J.
Eq. 554 (1892); First Pres. Church v. McKallor, 35 App. Div. 98 (N. Y.
i898); Re Bartlett, 163 Mass. 5o9 (1895).
"Re Vaughan, 33 Ch. Div. 187 (Eng. 1886); Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165
U. S. 342 (897).
"Swasey v. Amer. Bible Soc., 57 Me. 523 (I869).
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There is a middle class of cases where the beauest is for the
erection and perpetual upkeep of a monument to the testator or cer-
tain designated individuals, but is so tied up with a public benefit
that the whole bequest will be upheld as a charitable use. Such cases
must be decided on their facts and whether or not such a gift will
be held valid will be largely determined by the benefit that will ac-
crue to the public thereby."5 Within this class the recent New Jer-
sey. case seems to fall and the court, considering the purpose.of the
bequest, was cdarly j-ustified in holding that it was not for a charit-
able use. Notwithstanding this, the gift might have been upheld had
it provided for the immediate erection 6f a monument in memory
of the testator's father. The gift, however, was to take effect "when
the proper consent should be- obtained for the erection of the monu-
ment from the trustees of the park 'and the municipal authorities."
It is clear that such consent might never be secured and the gift was
therefore void as repugnant to the Rule against Perpetuities.
R.M.G.
'In Smith's Estate, 181 Pa. 109 (1897), a testamentary provision for the
erection of a memorial monument. or arch in Fairmount Park; Philadelphia,
and the construction of a children's playhouse and grounds, and for the
preservation and maintenance thereof forever, was held to be for a charitable
use on the ground that the monument would serve to keep alive the spirit
of patriotism and remembrance of the deeds of distinguished Civil War
veterans whose statues were directed to be placed thereon, notwithstanding
the fact that the testator directed to be placed upon the main column a
bronze statue of himself, with his name underneath in large letters, and that
the buildings to be erected should contain a memorial tablet. But cf.
McCaig v. Glasgow University (9o7), Sess. Cas. 231, where a testator
directed the income of his heritable estate to be made a perpetual trust for
the purpose of erecting-first, statues of himself and other members of his
family, and secondly, artistic towers on his estate, declaring that his wish was
to encourage rising young artists, and for that purpose prizes were to be
given for the best plans for the proposed statues and towers, it was held
that the public in general would not be benefited, and for that reason the
use was not charitable and therefore void.
